Introduction
Innovative and viable technologies that will improve aircraft safety for current and future civilian aircraft pose significant new challenges. For the next generation aircraft in which new technologies are used, safety standards must be also be improved to take into account the projected increase in air traffic. In this direction, a direction that has received considerable attention is the development of Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) strategies (see [1] - [4] for a survey) in order to help the crew to recover control capabilities quickly during a faulty situation. The FTC strategies can be classified into passive and active approaches. In the passive approach, the control algorithm is designed so that the system is able to achieve its given objectives, in fault-free as well as in faulty situations. However, achieving robustness is often possible at the expense of decreased nominal performance. The active approaches react to fault events by using a reconfiguration / accommodation mechanism to compensate the effect of faults either by selecting a pre-computed control law or by designing a new control strategy online (see [2] for a recent survey). Active approaches make use of an FDI mechanism to detect and diagnose any relevant failure which could lead to flight performance degradation. This shall be done sufficiently early and in compliance with the stringent operational and flight dynamics constraints for timely and safe recovery actions as well as to improve the situation awareness of the crew. In aerospace engineering practice, FDI approaches are predominately based on hardware redundancy that also fit into the current aircraft certification process. A major advantage of active FTC approach is that it provides a theoretical guarantee for nominal performances in fault-free situations and an acceptable level of performance for the considered failure modes.
A great number of solutions for active FTC is available in the open literature. The available design methodologies include those based on the linear quadratic control scheme [5] , modular approach [6] , Model-Based Predictive Control (MPC) method [7] , and H ∞ control theory [8] , to name a few.
Other works are based on Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) techniques [9, 10] , where the idea is to use the output of the FDI scheme, jointly with some subspace of the system states, as scheduling parameters of the LPV fault tolerant controller. The above mentioned works offer many attractive conceptual features, but at same time they present some shortcomings for effective in-flight implementation. For example, a significant increase in computational requirements, or drastic modification of the control law already in place (structure and/or parameters) lead to a major concern from certification/validation process point of view. In order to address this shortcoming, an attractive technique based on sliding mode allocation schemes has recently been introduced in [11, 12] and allows for redistribution of the control signals to the remaining functioning actuators when a fault occurs. One of the benefits of control allocation schemes is that the controller structure does not have to be reconfigured.
In such a setting, the main contribution of this work consists of the developing a methodology that takes explicitly into account the in-place control law, i.e., the FTC scheme is implemented without removing the validated and certified control law. Hence, the most beneficial feature of the proposed method is that the certification/validation process is reduced (no validation problem in fault-free situations). We also provide a discussion on fault compensability, in order to demonstrate that from a theoretical point of view, the considered faulty scenarios can be fully compensated by acting on the remaining healthy surfaces. This fault compensability issue is formulated as a trim deficiency analysis problem. The design of the FTC scheme is subsequently formulated as an H ∞ "mixed-sensitivity" strong stabilization problem. This framework is employed for easy management of FTC design trade-offs. The methodological developments are then followed by experimental results derived from piloted SIMONA flight simulator experiments. The goal is to guarantee a safe landing approach for a large transport aircraft (B747-100/200), despite the presence of faults. The investigated faulty scenario is related to Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) failures. We note that the paper focuses on THS fault, but since the presented method is general, they can be extended to other classes of faults.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the motivation of this work and the problem statement. Section 3 presents the modeling of the aircraft and its control laws and, in section 4, the FTC problem is formulated. Section 5 underlines some important theoretical issues, e.g., fault
compensability, and provides guidelines for the FTC design. Finally, section 6 is devoted to the simulation and experiment results.
Motivation and problem statement

Research context
Motivated by several aircraft accidents and, in particular, the crash of the El Al Flight 1862 in Bijlmermeer in 1992, a research group on Fault Tolerant Control, comprising a collaboration of thirteen European partners from industry, universities and research institutions, has been established within the framework of the GARTEUR co-operation program. The aim of the FM-AG (16) was to demonstrate the capability and viability of modern FTC schemes applied to a realistic, nonlinear design problem and to assess their capability to improve aircraft survivability.
The flight scenarios (see Fig. 1 for a detailed description of the considered flight scenario) have been selected to provide challenging assessment criteria to evaluate the effectiveness and potential benefits of the investigated FTC methods.
Test facilities
To evaluate the potential of the FTC schemes, a high-fidelity nonlinear aircraft model based on the Boeing 747-100/200 has been used. This model originally developed under Matlab/Simulink ® environment (see [13, 14] ), can accurately simulate real-life conditions and the performance of an aircraft. The Matlab/Simulink ® model has been later enhanced in [15] [16] [17] and [18] for the integrated assessment of GARTEUR's FTC methods. As a part of the FM-AG (16) ). This THS fault is assumed to correspond to a hardware malfunction. Hence, it is assumed that it is not possible to act on the faulty THS surface to accommodate this fault or put the surface into its neutral position.
Figure 1: Evaluated test maneuvers
The SIMONA flight simulator located at the Delft University of Technology, Netherlands, is presented in Fig. 2 . It is a six degrees of freedom hydraulic motion system tuned to give the pilot realistic inertial motion cues in nominal and failure conditions, specifically developed for humanmachine interface and handling qualities research [20] [21] [22] [23] . The simulator's flexible architecture [20] allows for a high-fidelity integration of the B747-100/200 Matlab/Simulink ® model by using the Real-Time Workshop code generation. The inputs and outputs of SIMONA simulator have been standardized such that the actuators are driven by a dSPACE/SIMULINK architecture. The interested reader can refer to [20] [21] [22] [23] for more details about the visual system, simulator cab and flight desk of the SIMONA flight simulator. 
Faulty model of the aircraft
The Boeing 747-100/200 model includes aerodynamic and engines models. Actuator and sensor characteristics are also taken into account together with models for wind, atmospheric turbulence and faults [13, 14] . The aerodynamic forces and moments are defined in terms of aerodynamic coefficients. These coefficients are given in the form of look-up tables. The dimension of the aircraft output vector is 142. However, all output signals are not necessary to control the aircraft.
Indeed, the FCS (presented in the next section) uses only 16 measured signals.
The dynamical behavior of the aircraft is described by the following nonlinear state representation ( )
where x NL , u NL , y NL are the state, input, and output vectors respectively, of the full aircraft nonlinear model. The input and state components are given in Appendix A (see Table A .1 and A.2). The signal w denotes the process noise related to, e.g., winds and atmospheric turbulences. The signal v represents the measurement noises which are assumed to be uniformly distributed random signals.
In this model, physical parameters, e.g., mass, inertia, are fixed to their nominal values. The interested reader can refer to [13] for a complete description of the aircraft output vector y NL .
Once a trim condition is established for the nonlinear aircraft model, a linear model is generated to capture the dynamics [24] . Simplified models for the longitudinal and lateral modes can then be derived to gain a better physical insight into the modes and their interactions. These models are widely used in aeronautical engineering and are not developed here (see [24] for more details).
Since the THS is a symmetric surface, THS faults act mainly on the longitudinal motion (lateral motion effects are neglected). Therefore, the following simplified state-space model derived from (1) and (2) is retained to describe the dynamics of the aircraft: Taking into account the THS faults, the following linear state-space model is derived from (3) by assuming that ρ is close to its nominal value during the considered flight trajectory (longitudinal flight):
Here, B e and B h are matrices of appropriate dimensions deduced from the B matrix in ( have shown that it is sufficient for the purpose of our analysis (see [25] for more details).
Modeling the FCS
The goal we now pursue is the design of an FTC scheme which provides safe accommodation without removing the in-place control laws. Before proposing a FTC scheme, it is then required to model the already in-place control system. The SIMONA control architecture is standardized as presented in Fig. 3 . Motion Control Computer (MCC) corresponds to a standard B747 autoflight system composed by one Flight Control System (FCS) and a path planning unit which generates reference trajectories (see [26] for more details). The MCC inputs are the manual pilot inputs, the Mode Control Panel (MCP) inputs and the sensor data bus. As mentioned above, the MCC outputs permit to drive the actuators by using a dSPACE/SIMULINK architecture. Two control modes are implemented in the simulator: in the manual control mode, the aircraft is only controlled by the FCS while in the automatic control mode, the FCS is fitted with the path planning unit. Because the THS faults act mainly on the longitudinal motion, only the longitudinal part of the FCS is discussed here (see, Fig. 4 for an illustration). As it can be seen, the elevator and the THS deflections are defined according to the following control laws:
where δ col and i href are the reference inputs to elevator and THS surfaces, the parameter ε denotes a vector tuned to achieve flight performances. For instance, ε is a function of the dynamic pressure q (the interested reader can refer to [26] for more details). As classically designed in the aeronautical engineering, it can be seen that the FCS remains in a gain-schedule-based controller where the scheduling parameters are δ col and ε. 
FTC problem formulation
The FTC problem formulation is now considered. In order to keep the already in-place control laws, we propose to set up the FTC loop as illustrated in here, see [26] for more details).
The proposed scheme is thus composed of three parts:
corresponds to the longitudinal FCS unit (see, equations (5) and (6));
-G is the model of aircraft dynamics (see, section 3.1);
-K represents a FTC part which generates an additional control signal ũ to be added to the nominal control signal δ e computed according to (5) . The overall FTC strategy works in such a way that, in a fault free situation, the FTC loop is not activated leaving the aircraft only controlled by the in-place FCS. When the THS fault is detected by the on-board Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) unit, the FTC part becomes activated via a switching logic, i.e., the FCS is not removed.
The FTC design problem can now be formulated as follows:
Problem 1:
Assume that a solution to the FTC problem exists, i.e., the effects of faults are compensable (this assumption will be discussed in section 5.1). The goal is to design a controller K to produce the new control signal
such that the stability of the feedback system illustrated in Fig. 5 First of all, an important property of all safety critical systems is that the multivariable control law must be stable (integrity of the system [27] ). In addition, as it can be seen in Fig. 5 , the FTC
scheme is in open loop in fault-free situations. Therefore, an important design requirement is that the dynamic controller K must be stable. This point will be discussed in the next section.
Remark 1: Coming back to the setup diagrams in Fig. 5 , it is natural to inquire about the stability of the inner FTC loop due to the presence of the switch. Here, we assume that once a fault is detected, the switch is activated and the compensation signal ũ remains active at all times. The remaining problem then concerns the transient behavior of the signal ũ . In order to avoid undesirable transient phenomena, a practically relevant solution is given in [25] . To avoid duplicating materials presented in [25] , this problem is not discussed here. The interested reader can refer to [25] for further details.
Remark 2:
Another important question concerns the activation delay of the FTC strategy. During this time interval, the faulty system is controlled by the nominal control law which has not been designed for faulty situations. This can lead to undesired transient behavior of the aircraft that may be catastrophic, e.g., excessive load factor and large angle of attack. This problem is also highly related to the detection delay of the FDI part. In this work, an on-board FDI scheme (hardware redundancy) is used and it is assumed that the detection delay does not exceed 500ms [28] . Hence, the main motivation is to show how the FTC mechanism will regain system stability and performance in the worst case situation, i.e., for the worst time delay (500ms).
Theoretical issue
Fault compensability
Before starting the design of the FTC loop, it is natural to ask about the ability of the aircraft to be maintained on its flight trajectory in the presence of faults. In other words, the question is: does there exist a "solution" that fully compensates the fault effects by acting on the remaining healthy surfaces? To answer this question, we formulate a fault compensability problem. The goal is to analyze the ability of the aircraft to be kept on its trajectory, despite the presence of damages in its THS. This problem can be formulated in terms of defining the flight envelope regions in the "altitude-true airspeed" space where the aircraft cannot be rotationally balanced in the presence of faults. This trim deficiency analysis can be formulated according to the following nonlinear constrained optimization problem:
Consider the nonlinear model of the aircraft defined by (1 A point in the "altitude-true airspeed" space is considered "trim deficient" if the solution to the above optimization problem leads to a criterion higher than a prescribed value χ corresponding to the boundary between the trimmable and non-trimmable regions. As a consequence, a fault is considered non-compensable if the flight trajectory of the aircraft (projected in the "altitude-true airspeed" space) crosses a non-trimmable region. 
H ∞ strong stabilizationt
Having shown that the considered fault is compensable, we consider the design of the FTC loop.
Consider the setup shown in Fig. 5 and suppose that a fault has occurred and thus that the FTC loop is activated. Let us denote by ( )
, the matrices of the state space model associated with K . Fig. 5 leads to the following dynamic equations: 
where x and x denote the state vector defined in (4) and those associated to K , respectively.
From (10), (11) and (12), the FTC loop state-space model G FTC which is the transfer between T e THS f ) ( δ and y is defined according to: This expression shows that the stability of the overall loop depends on ( )
. This is an expected and rather evident result. From this analysis, it follows that, as long as
, stability of the FTC loop and flight performances are preserved, despite the presence of faults. This analysis suggests the following proposition which provides a general formulation to the original FTC problem in terms of H ∞ "mixed-sensitivity" constraints: (15) , (16) and (17) hold.
is the set of all controllers satisfying (15) , (16) . In particular, the central regulator
Design of K
The goal is now to compute the gain K following the aforementioned H ∞ strong stabilization technique. Here, the design objectives will be only fixed on the control law error signal and the control magnitude since the desired performances (no actuator saturation phenomena, track the reference trajectory) can be fully achieved. Then, the problem turns out to be the design of a stable controller K such that (15)-(16) are satisfied. The setup diagram used for this design framework is given in Fig. 7 
where the matrix
is introduced to select h and θ from y (see Fig. 7 for easy reference). The transfer functions G e and G h are respectively, given by
where A, B e , B h and C matrices are defined according to (4) .
Figure 7: FTC design problem
The weighting function 1 W is chosen to achieve small damping ratio on altitude h (m) and pitch angle θ (rad) in a faulty situation. Moreover, an integral component is introduced in 1 W to guarantee that the aircraft keeps its trajectory despite the fault. 2 W has been fixed to take into account actuator saturation phenomena. More precisely, 
Using some direct linear-fractional algebraic manipulations (LFT), the problem illustrated in Fig. 7 reduces to the problem presented in Fig. 8 where it can be verified that P is defined according to: 
, is retained since Â is found stable (see the discussion in section 5.2). Fig. 9 shows frequency responses obtained for this solution. As it can be seen: 
Simulation and experimental results
The controller K is first implemented within the Matlab/Simulink ® simulation benchmark, and after its validation through extensive simulations, within the SIMONA flight simulator. The architecture used to implement K in the SIMONA simulator is presented in Fig. 10 . can not be accommodated by the in-place control laws (see [25] ). To get a deeper insight into the situation, Figure 12 provides more details about the behavior of the aircraft via the altitude h, the pitch rate q, the velocity V TAS , the pitch angle θ, the altitude rate h & and the control signals
To emphasize the benefit of the proposed FTC scheme, the same simulation is performed when the aircraft is only controlled by the in-place dedicated control systems (no FTC) and when the FTC loop acts. The plots are given for a flight of 510s. As it can be seen from Fig. 12 , when the FTC scheme is in place, the controlled faulty system keeps the nominal flight trajectory, i.e., the nominal landing approach. Furthermore, it can be seen that, as expected, the elevator deflections do not violate the position and rate limits (the deflection and rate Figure 13 illustrates the behavior of the load factor n z . As it can be seen, the magnitude of undesirable transients on n z is acceptable since the load factor behavior in fault-free situation is similar to the behavior obtained with the proposed FTC strategy in faulty situation. Note that the pick value of n z corresponds to the flight situation where the roll angle is near its critical value (55°). It can be seen from Fig. 12 and 13 that this critical flight phase is well managed by the proposed scheme since there are no saturation phenomena of elevator surfaces and, as previously mentioned, the magnitude of n z is similar to fault-free case.
Remark 3:
As mentioned in Section 4, the activation of the switch may cause some undesirable transient phenomena. To overcome this problem, a solution is discussed in [25] . Here, such bumpless solution has been proved to be not necessary. 
Experiment results
The pilot experiment is now considered. The tested scenario is as follows:
The flight starts at 1000m, heading 0°;
(ii) First, the altitude reference is changed to 915m;
(iii) It is followed by a manual heading change to 90°. When the aircraft is stable on the new heading, the stabilizer runaway failure is introduced (at t=172 s);
(iv) An altitude change to 610m is done (iv) using the MCP (see Fig. 3 for easy reference of the Mode Control Panel);
(v) It is followed by another manual turn to 180°. Thrust is kept at a minimum;
(vi) When nearing the localizer, a final turn is done to 270° and the localizer signal is manually captured. In the meantime, flaps are being deployed;
(vii) On glideslope capture, another altitude change is done to 330m using the MCP;
(viii)
Descending at low speed, we again capture the glideslope and a final altitude change is done to 33m. The run ends very near the threshold, with correct speed for landing. 15 illustrates more precisely the behavior of the aircraft via the altitude h, the pitch rate q, the roll rate p, the yaw rate r, the velocity V TAS , the pitch angle θ, the roll angle φ, the yaw angle ψ, the load factor n z and the control signals applied to elevator surfaces 
Additional evaluation criterion
Finally, the computation time of the proposed FTC strategy is evaluated and compared to the nominal FCS control law, for a possible implementation in a real-time flight control system. This evaluation is done using built-in SIMONA procedures and will not be described here. The results (see Table 1 ) show that it takes about more than 8ms for the control law to be computed when the FTC scheme is engaged. This computation time has been judged acceptable by the industrial partners of the FM-AG(16) project, for an on-board implementation. 
